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Abstract
We present a new axiomatization of classical mereology in which the three
components of the theory—ordering, composition, and decomposition prin-
ciples—are neatly separated.The equivalence of our axiom systemwith other,
more familiar systems is established by purely deductivemethods, along with
additional results on the relative strengths of the composition and decompo-
sition axioms of each system.
As a formal theory of parts and wholes, mereology should tell us three sorts of
thing. It should say:
(i) what sort of relation parthood is;
(ii) what sorts of condition govern mereological composition, i.e., intuitively,
what it takes to form a whole by “adding things” together;
(iii) what sorts of condition govern mereological decomposition, i.e., intuitively,
what happens when we “subtract things” from a given whole.
Classical mereology—the theory stemming from the work of Leśniewski [3] and
of Leonard and Goodman [2]—provides a clear answer to each of these questions.
It answers (i) by taking parthood to be a partial order (i.e., a reflexive, transitive,
antisymmetric relation); it answers (ii) by taking composition to be unrestricted
(so that adding any number of things together, no matter how disparate and gerry-
mandered those thingsmight be, always yields a further thing); and its answers (iii)
by taking decomposition to be fully subtractive (so that the mereological difference
between any two things, when it exists, always leaves an exact remainder). Interest-
ingly, however, none of the extant axiomatizations of classical mereology does the
job explicitly. All are explicit about (ii), and all are (more or less) explicit about (i),
modulo redundancies. When it comes to (iii), however, the answer usually comes
as a theorem. That is, the axioms do not quite address the question directly but
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rather tell us something else, typically in the form of a supplementation principle,
from which the answer follows. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this way
of proceeding. Yet it would be more natural and theoretically more elegant if in
each case the answer could be captured directly (and non-redundantly) by means
of suitable axiom(s). In this note we offer a new axiomatization of classical mere-
ology that does just that.
In section 1, we introduce our axiom system and explain how the axioms give
clear and natural answers to questions (i), (ii), and (iii). In section 2, we explore
more deeply the connection between composition and decomposition, providing
a formal argument to the effect that they are ‘two-sides of the same coin’.This serves
to illustrate the connections between (ii) and (iii) displayed by our axiomatization.
In Section 3 we prove the equivalence of our system with other, more familiar ax-
iom systems by purely deductive methods. We conclude in Section 4 with some
additional remarks on the relative strengths of the composition and decomposi-
tion axioms of each theory vis à vis our initial questions.
1 the axiom system cm
We assume a standard first-order language with identity supplied with a distin-
guished binary predicate constant, P , to be interpreted as the parthood relation.
The underlying logic is the classical predicate calculus.
To introduce our axiom system for classical mereology, CM, we begin with
some definitions.
(D.1) PPxy : Pxy á x  y Proper Parthood
(D.2) Oxy : Çz.Pzx á Pzy/ Overlap
(D.3) F'x : Åz.' Pzx/ á Åy.Åz.' Pzy/ Pxy/ Fusion
D.1 is a standard definition to the effect that a proper part is any part distinct from
the whole.1 D.2 simply states that things overlap whenever they have at least one
part in common. As for D.3, from the standpoint of mereology this is a slightly
unusual definition of the fusion predicate, which is meant to capture the notion
of something being composed of a specified collection of things.2 It is, however,
straightforward and intuitive from the perspective of lattice theory and algebra.
Where ' is any open formula with just z free, F'x says that x is a minimal upper
bound, relative to P , of the objects satisfying': the first conjunct states that x is an
upper bound of the 's, while the second states any (other) upper bound includes
x as a part.
1The usual alternate definition, PPxy : Pxy á Pyx, is equivalent in this system.
2For other definitions, see e.g. [1] and [?, §4].
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Now for the axioms.
(A.1) ÅxPxx Reflexivity
(A.2) ÅxÅy..Pxy á Pyx/ x = y/ Antisymmetry
(A.3) ÅxÅyÅz..Pxy á Pyz/ Pxz/ Transitivity
(A.4) Çz' ÇxF'x Unrestricted Fusion
(A.5) ÅxÅy.Pxy  ÇzÅw.Pwz  .Pwx á Owy/// Remainder
The first three axioms, A.1, A.2, and A.3, state that P is a weak partial order.
Together with D.1, they entail that PP is the corresponding strict partial order.
These axioms constitute CM’s answer—the standard answer—to (i).
The next axiom, A.4, is actually an axiom schema. It states, for any satisfiable
open formula ' with just z free, that a fusion of the 's exists. This axiom schema
constitutes CM’s answer to (ii) and, again, it is in the spirit of the standard answer
(modulo any discrepancies concerning the exact definition of ‘fusion’): any specifi-
able non-empty collection of things compose something. It is easily seen from A.2
thatF'x is always unique. So, the upper bounds that exist according to A.4 are least
upper bounds, corresponding to the familiar lattice-theoretic notion of supremum.
The last axiom is, when it is discussed at all, referred to as the Remainder Prin-
ciple, and is usually derived as a theorem.3 It states that whenever x is not itself part
of y, there is always something—a remainder of y in x—that has as parts all and
only those parts of x that don’t overlap y. Again, it follows immediately from A.2
(and A.1) that such a remainder must be unique, so A.5 is truly a decomposition
principle in the sense of (iii); it tells us exactly what is left when y is “subtracted”
from x. Of course, if x were part of y there wouldn’t be anything left of x were y
to be subtracted, and this explains the antecedent of A.5. When the antecedent ap-
plies, however, we know from A.1 that x  y, and there are three different cases.
It may be that y is a proper part of x, in which case the remainder would just be
x without y. Or x and ymay properly overlap, and hence the remainder would be
the biggest part of x that doesn’t overlap y, namely x minus all the parts it has in
commonwith y. Or x and ymay have no parts in common at all, in which case sub-
tracting y from x would leave x just as it is. Each of these scenarios is represented
in Figure 1, where the shaded area represents the remainder of y in x.⁴
3See e.g. [4, p. 89].
⁴Some readers will be reminded of the notion of set difference, X ä Y , namely the set of all
members ofX that are not members of Y . In mathematics, these sorts of remainders are also called
relative complements, and the same notion is familiar from logic: where p and q are propositions,
the relative complement of q in p is the proposition p á q.
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Figure 1: Cases where Pxy
2 residuation
We have seen informally that A.5 is a ‘decomposition’ principle in the sense re-
quired by (iii). But this point can be made more formally, by showing that fusions
and remainders are ‘two sides of the same coin’, so to speak.
To seewhy, let us focus on the binary variant of fusions, sometimes calledmere-
logical sums. Let  be the open formula ‘z = aâ z = b’, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are terms.
Then the sum of a and b is defined as the unique x such that F x:
(D.4) a á b := xF x Sum
In classical logic Çz.z = a â z = b/ is always true, so A.4 implies that binary sums
always exist. Is there a decomposition-correlate to this fact?
For the time being, let us introduce the placeholder c ² a (read ‘c without a’)
to stand for an object that satisfies the following condition:
(1) Pc.a á b/ iff P .c ² a/b Residuation
This is a biconditional connecting composition with decomposition in a natural
way; it says that c is part of the sum of a and b iff c without a is part of b. (Note that
since a á b = b á a, owing to the commutativity of â, we have that P .c ² a/b iff
P .c ² b/a.) Those familiar with logic will be reminded of a well-known residua-
tion condition, namely
(2) p á q ï r iff p ï q  r
In classical logic, this is equivalent to
(3) p á q ï r iff p ï q â r
from which we obtain the algebraic ‘dual’ of (2):
(4) p ï q â r iff p á q ï r
This is a residuation condition in logic that is perfectly analogous to (1).
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Now, c ² a is so far just a placeholder.Wewant to knowunder what conditions
(1) holds: when does c ² a exist, and what sort of thing is it? To answer the first
question, we note immediately that c ² c cannot exist: it would have to be a ‘null’
element, an algebraic ‘zero’ relative to P , and the non-existence of such an element
is a distinguishing feature of classical mereology (whence the conditional form of
A.4). Thus, in (1) an exception must be made when c = a. Indeed, the same is true
wheneverPca (of which c = a is a special case by A.1), since c ² awould not exist
for the same reason.⁵ This is exactly the exclusion given in the antecedent of A.5.
To answer the second question, we now show that, for any c and a that meet
the exclusion condition just mentioned, c ² a is precisely the remainder of a in c
stipulated to exist by the relevant instance of A.5. That is, let d be that remainder:
(5) Åw.Pwd  .Pwc á Owa//
We show that, for arbitrary b, d meets the constraint in (1):
(6) Pc.a á b/ iff Pdb
Proof of (6) For the right-to-left-direction, assume that Pc.a á b/. Since Pdd,
by the-direction of (5) we have that Pdc and Oda. From Pdc it follows imme-
diately thatPd.aáb/ (by A.3) and this, together withOda, implies thatPdb.⁶ For
the left-to-right direction, assume that Pdb. We distinguish two cases, depending
on whether or not c has a part in common with a. In the first case, we have Oca
and we want to show that Pc.a á b/. Suppose not. Then, by A.5, a á bmust leave a
remainder in c, i.e., there is some z such that Åw.Pwz  .Pwc á Ow.a á b///.
Since Pzz by A.1, it follows that Pzc and Oz.a á b/, and hence Oza. By the
}-direction of (5) we obtain Pzd and thus, by A.3, Pzb (since Pdb by assump-
tion).This implies Pz.aáb/, and thereforeOz.aáb/—contradition. So, Pc.aáb/
after all. In the second case we have Oca. Since we also have Pcc by A.1, by the
}-direction of (5) we obtain Pcd. So, again by A.3, Pcb, and hence Pc.a á b/.
We have thus shown that the remainder of any two given objects c and a, when
it exists, meets the condition for c ² a. This establishes that A.5 provides an ax-
iomatic answer to (iii) that mirrors the answer to (ii) provided by A.4: the Remain-
der axiom quite simply stipulates the existence of the decomposition-correlate to
(binary) composition.⁷
⁵In a boolean algebra, x² y = ò iff x² y f ò iff x f y á ò iff x f y.
⁶This last step assumes a principle called Filtration, which we show is a theorem of CM in §3.1.
⁷Note: every boolean algebra is a residuated lattice, with a à *b the residual of à, but it is not
true in general that every residuated lattice is a boolean algebra. In the case of CM, the remainder
principle serves to stipulate the existence of residuals of sums; however, merely adding a residuation
axiom in place of A.5 would not be strong enough to yield classical mereology.
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3 equivalences
It remains to be shown that CM is indeed an axiomatization of classical mereology.
We do so by proving the equivalence of CM with two systems for classical mereol-
ogy due essentially to Paul Hovda [1]. In each case we only prove one side of the
equivalence, namely that the system in question is included in CM. The converse
inclusion is trivial, since, as we mentioned, the five axioms of CM are well-known
theses of classical mereology.
3.1 proof 1
In [1, §3.1] it is shown that classical mereology can be axiomatized by taking A.3
and A.4 along with the following two axioms.⁸
(A.6) ÅxÅy.PPxy  Çz.Pzy á Ozx// Weak Supplementation
(A.7) Çz' ÅxÅy..Pyx á F'x/ Çz.' á Ozy// Filtration
Call this system CM1. We show that CM1 Ó CM. Specifically, first we show that
A.6 is entailed by A.1 + A.2 + A.5. Next we show that A.7 is entailed by A.1 + A.2
+ A.3 + A.5.
Step 1: Proof of A.6 Assume for conditional proof that PPxy. By D.1 we have
that x  y and Pxy. So, by Antisymmetry, Pyx. Hence, by Remainder, there is
some z such that Åw.Pwz  .Pwy á Owx//. By Reflexivity, Pzz, and hence
Pzy á Ozx as required.
Step 2: Proof of A.7 Assume the antecedent of A.7 and assume, for arbitrary x,
y, and ', that Pyx and F'x. We need to show that Çz.' á Ozy/. We distinguish
two cases, depending on whether or not x = y. In case x = y, we have by assump-
tion that F'y and hence, by D.3, Åz.'  Pzy/. By assumption we also have Çz'
and so we obtain Çz.'áPzy/, whence Çz.'áOzy/ by Reflexivity and D.2. In the
second case, where x  y, we immediately have PPyx by D.1, hence Pyx by An-
tisymmetry. By Remainder, this implies that there’s some c satisfying the following
condition:
(7) Åw.Pwc  .Pwx á Owy//
⁸Actually, the formulation of A.7 in [1] ismissing the antecedent.That formulation is too strong,
admitting instances that are false in any one-elementmodel inwhich the only element of the domain
fails to satisfy x. The error is corrected in [5, §2].
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Suppose for reductio that Åz.' Ozy/. Let a be some arbitrary object satisfying
' (whose existence follows from the assumption that Çz'). Since x is the fusion of
the's (again by assumption), D.3 implies that Pax. And since we also have Oay,
we obtain Pac by the }-direction of (7). But recall that a was arbitrary, hence
Åz.'  Pzc/, which is to say that c is an upper bound of the 's. Thus, since x is
the least upper bound of the 's, it follows by D.3 that Pxc. Now recall that Pyx,
so by Transitivity Pyc. By the-direction of (7), this implies that Pyx á Oyy.
But Reflexivity gives us Pyy, and so we obtain Oyy. Contradiction. It follows that
Åz.' Ozy/, i.e., Çz.' á Ozy/.
3.2 proof 2
In [1, §4] it is shown that classical mereology can also be axiomatized by taking
A.2, A.3 and A.4 together with the following axioms:⁹
(A.8) Åx.1x Çz.Ozx á Åw..Owx Pwz/ á .Owz  Pwx//// Comp
(A.9) ÇxÇy y  x ÇxÅyPxy No Zero
where
(D.5) 1x : ÅyPyx Universe
We show again that this system, CM2, is included in CM, i.e., that A.8 and A.9
follow from our axioms A.1–A.5.
Step 1: Proof of A.8 Notice that, by A.4, there is a fusion of those objects that
satisfy Çy z = y, namely a fusion of everything. Call it ñ. By the first conjunct of
D.3, everything is part of ñ, so such a fusion satisfies the predicate defined in D.5.
Now, the following is an instance of A.5:
(8) Åy.Pñy  ÇzÅw.Pwz  .Pwñ á Owy///
Thus, since Pññ by A.1, we obtain:
(9) Åx.1x ÇzÅw.Pwz  .Pwñ á Owx///
Let a be some non-1 individual and let b be a matching witness for z in (9). We
want to show that b is also a witness for z in the corresponding instance of A.8. We
have to prove three claims:
(a) Oba
⁹Strictly speaking, the formulation of A.8 in [1, §4] uses a stronger variant of O that rules out
overlap by the null element. However, the difference is immaterial; see [1, pp. 76, 82].
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(b) Åw.Owa Pwb/
(c) Åw.Owb  Pwa/
By (9) we have that Åw.Pwb .Pwñ á Owa//, and since Pwñ holds for allw
by definition, we obtain
(10) Åw.Pwb Owa/
To prove (a), suppose for reductio that Oba. Then, for some c, Pcb á Pca. From
the first conjunct, together with the-direction of (10), we obtain Oca. But this
contradicts the second conjunct, Pca (since Pcc by A.1). So Oba. Concerning
(b), we note that this claim is just the}-direction of (10). As for (c), pick arbitrary
w so that Owb. We want to show that Pwa. Suppose for reductio that Pwa.
By A.5, there must be some remainder of a in w, i.e., some c such that Åy.Pyc 
.Pyw á Oya//. By A.1, Pcc, and so Pcw á Oca. But then the-direction of
(10) gives us Pcb, and hence c is part of both w and b. So Owb. This contradicts
our initial assumption onw, and so we conclude that Pwa.
Step 2: Proof of A.9 Assume according to the antecedent of A.9 that there are
at least two things, a and b. Without loss of generality, let Pab (since if Pab, we
could assumePba byA.2 and reasonmutatis mutandis). By A.5, we have for some
c that Åw.Pwc  .PwaáOwb//. Now suppose there were an object—call itò—
so that ÅwPòw. Then we would have Pòc, and hence Pòa á Oòb. But by A.1
the latter conjunct contradicts Pòb, which holds by supposition. Hence, there can
be no such ò.
4 final remarks
It should be noted that Step 2 in the last proof shows that A.9 is actually redundant
in CM2, since it turns out that A.4 and A.8 imply both A.1 and A.5. For A.1, see
[1, p. 75]. For A.5, given arbitrary a and b such that Pab, we always get a remain-
der of b in a by taking the complement of b if 1a, and otherwise the complement of
the fusion of bwith a’s complement (where, generally speaking, the complement of
x is the entity z posited by the consequent of A.8, whose uniqueness follows from
A.2). Indeed, since A.1 follows from A.8 alone, the latter axiom is enough to de-
rive A.9 as a theorem, as noted in [5, §3]: if ò existed, it would overlap everything,
hence it could not satisfy the first conjunct in the existential consequent of A.8.
Does this mean that our axiom system is just a minor variant of CM2, i.e., of
A.2 + A.3 + A.4 + A.8? In a way, yes: we are just splitting A.8 into A.1 and A.5.
Philosophically, however, the difference is significant.
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For one thing, the very fact that it implies Reflexivity shows that A.8 is not just a
decomposition principle; it answers part of question (i) along with question (iii).1⁰
In our axiom system, by contrast, these questions are answered separately. (That
A.1 does not follow from A.5 can be seen by considering a model with a single
element, a, such that Paa.)
Secondly, A.8 is not just a decomposition principle, for it is not just about how a
given entity may be decomposed; it actually stipulates the existence of something
outside that entity. Since there are things that are not part of, say, this table, ac-
cording to A.8 there is some humongous composite entity made up of absolutely
everything that doesn’t overlap this table. Since there is more to this world than
Ohio, there is something that consists of everything except Ohio. Entities of this
sort—the table’s complement, Ohio’s complement—will not be objectionable to a
classical mereologist who accepts the Unrestricted Fusion axiom A.4. That axiom,
however, is intended to answer question (ii), and so again it appears that A.8 over-
steps its bounds as an answer to (iii). By contrast, A.5 is truly a decomposition
principle in that it tells us one critical way in which any object x may be decom-
posed. Provided Pxy, x may be decomposed entirely into x² y and (when it
exists) x² .x² y/. That is, A.5 only stipulates the existence of parts of x.11
For these reasons,while registering the formal similarity betweenCMandCM2,
we conclude that the two systems differ significantly vis à vis the general task of an-
swering questions (i)–(iii). The axiomatic answers provided by CM2, like those of
CM1 and of other standard axiomatizations of classical mereology, are to some ex-
tent indirect; those provided by CM are explicit and neatly separated. They are, in
this sense, the ‘natural’ answers we were looking for.12
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